INTRODUCTION
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is used for the disposal of transuranic(TRU) radioactive waste from defense programs of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP facility is located 20 miles (42 km) east of the town of Carlsbad in southeasternNew Mexico. The repository is located in the northern Delaware Basin, 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground in the Permian-age Salado bedded salt formation.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for the regulatory oversight of the radioactive waste disposal at the WIPP facility. The EPA's role is defined by the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA), passed initially by Congress in 1992 and amended in 19961'2. Specifically, the LWA delegated three sequential tasks to the EPA. First, the EPA had to finalize general regulations (non-site specific) that it first published in 1985, for highly radioactive waste disposa13. The final form was published in the Federal Register in 1993, located at 40 CFR Part 191 , and limits the amount of radioactive material that may escape fi-om a disposal facility to the accessible environment, and protects individuals and groundwater resources from radioactive contamiuation4. Second, the EPA had to develop by rulemaking, criteria to implement and interpret the general 40 CFR Part 191 radioactive waste disposal regulations specifically for the WIPP. The EPA issued its "WIPP Compliance Criteria", at 40 CFR Part 194, in 19965. These criteria described what information the DOE must submit in order to comply with the disposaI standardsat SubpartsB and C of 40 CFR Part 191a , and clarified the basis on which the EPA's compliance determination will be made. Third, the EPA had to review information submitted by the DOE in response to 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 , and publish a determination of compliance.
In October 1996, the DOE submitted its Compliance Certification Application (CCA)G to the EPA to demonstrate compliance with the EPA's radioactive waste disposal standards. In May 1998, after a 19-month review process, the EPA statedin its final certification decision thatthe WIPP will comply with the EPA's disposal standards'.
In accordance with the EPA regulations and criteria, the CCA contained a series of calculations that assessed the performance of the WIPP facility over the next 10,000 years in terms of radioactive releases and human safety. The requirements of the CCA WIPP performance assessment (PA) were prescribed by the EPA regulations and criteria, which specified: (1) the context of the PA within the overall decision-making process; (2) the assessment time periods thatthe PA should cover; (3) the basis for the treatmentof uncertainty; (4) the requirements for peer review (5) a basis for deciding what should be included and excluded from consideration in the PA and, in some cases, the methodology for how specific features, events, and processes (FEPs) thatmay potentially impact the performance of a Subpart A of the EPA's 40 CFR Part 191 standardsapplies to management and storage operations and considers operational safety rather than disposal. It is not implemented for the WIPP by 40 CFR Part 194 , and is not considered in this paper. Court found that the EPA had neither reconciled the Individual Protection Requirements with Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act, nor explained the divergence between the two sets of criteria. Furthermore, the EPA had not explained the basis for the 1,000-year performance criterion in the Individual Protection Requirements. The Court also found that the Groundwater Protection Requirements were promulgated without proper notice and comment. The LWA of 19921 reinstatedthe 1985 disposal standards,excluding the parts of the standardsthat were questioned by the Court (40 CFR~191.15, Individual Protection Requirements, and 40 CFR~191.16 , Ground Water Protection Requirements). As outlined in Sect. 1, the LWA required the EPA to promulgate disposal standardsand specific criteria to apply these standardsto the WIPP, and to evaluate the WIPP compliance application. Thus, the DOE ceased to be self-regulating.
On December 20, 1993 4.1.2 Performance Assessment and Compliance Assessment 40 CFR $ 191 .12 defines a PA as "an analysis that: (1) identifies the processes and events that might affect the disposal system; (2) examines the effects of these processes and events on the performance of the disposal system, and (3) estimates the cumulative releases of radionuclides, considering the associated uncertainties, caused by all significant processes and events. These estimates shaIl be incorporated into an overall probability distribution of cumulative release to the extent practicable." 191.15 and at $191.24 (undisturbed performance) . In the CCAC, the disturbed performance PA and the undisturbed performance compliance assessments were discussed in separate chapters. However, the CCA compliance assessmentsmainly used a subset of the models and methodologies used for the CCA PA. Therefore, the remainder of this section focuses on the CCA WIPP PA, except where the compliance assessments adopted a significantly different approach. 
Format of Assessment and Analytical Results
The required assessment results for comparison with the regulations are determined by the standardsin 40 CFR $ 191.13(a), $ 191.15(a), and $ 191.24(a) , as cumulative release, annual committed effective dose, and radionuclide concenbation in groundwater, respectively. 40 CFR Part 194 provides additional criteria regarding the methodology for calculation of these results, and the format in which they should be presented. Table 1 
Format of Assessment Results
where Qi is the cumulative release in curies (Ci) of radionuclide i into the accessible environment during the 10,000-year period following closure of the repository, Li is the release limit in curies for radionuclide i given in 40 CFR Part 191, and C is the total amount of curies of alpha-emitting transuranicradionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years to be emplaced in the repository.
For the compliance assessment results, the EPA criteria specify several calculational assumptions. For the annual committed effective dose, the protected individual shall be assumed to reside at the single geographic point on the surface of the accessible environment where that individual would be expected to receive the highest dose from radionuclide releases (tj 194.51) . All potential exposure pathways from the disposal system to individuals shall be considered and the individuals shall be assumed to consume two liters per day of drinking water from any underground source of drinking water in the accessible environment ($ 194.52) . Also, all underground sources of drinking water in the accessible environment that are expected to be affected by the disposal system over the regulatory time frame shall be considered ($ 191.53) .
Inpefiorting the CCAcompliance assessments, fie DOEapplied abowding-analysis approach using unrealistic assumptions that resulted in over-estimation of potential doses and contaminant concentrations: ( 1) 40 CFR f 191.15 Individual Dose. Only 9 out of 300 CCA undisturbed performance simulations led to non-zero (i.e., >1 x 10-18 curies/liter) calculated concentrations, all of which were still extremely low (from around 6 x 10-18up to a maximum of around 6 x 10"12curies per liter), and all of which were in the anhydrite interbeds within the Salado at the site boundary. All contaminants reaching the accessible environment were assumed to be directly available to a receptor. Brine derived fi-om the anhydrite interbeds has total dissolved solids (TDS) concentrations of about 324,000 parts per millio~this represents a concentration that could not be consumed by humans. For the bounding analysis, the calculation included the dilution of this brine by a factor of 32.4 to a TDS concentration of 10,000 parts per million, which is the upper limit for potable wate~and (2) 40 CFR f 191.24 Growzdwater Protection. The DOE assumed the presence of an underground source of drinking water (USDWe) in close proximity to the WIPP land withdrawal area boundary, even though available data indicate thatnone exists near the boundary.
The 40 CFR Part 194 criteria do not specify a format for the compliance assessment results for 40 CFR $ 191.15(a) and~191.24(a). However, 40 CFR $ 194.55(c) does require the calculation of several radiological measures using random samples from the entire range of values of each probability distribution developed to generate a range of (1) estimated committed effective doses received from all pathways pursuant to $ 194.51 and $ 194.52; (2) estimated radionuclide concentrations in USDWS pursuant to~194.53; and (3) estimated dose equivalent received from USDWS pursuant to $ 194.52 and $ 194.53. As described above, the DOE used a set of conservative bounding assumptions regarding exposure pathways to calculate maximum doses to individuals and maximum concentrations in USDWS. Because they were orders of magnitude within the compliance limits, only the maximum doses and concentrations were compared to the Individual and Groundwater Protection Requirements.
Format of Analytical Results
The format of the cumulative release results for 40 CFR $ 191.13(a) is specified in more detail at 40 CFR $194.34(a) , which requires the results to be assembled into "complementary, cumulative distribution functions"
(CCDFS) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative releases caused by all significant processes and events. The generation of multiple CCDFS is described in Ref. 26 .
' An Underground Source of Dfinking Water is defined at 40 CFR j 191.22 as "... an aquifer or its portion which:
(1) Supplies any public water system, or (2) Contains a sufficient quantity of ground water to supply a public water system; and (i) Currently supplies drinking water for human consumption; or (ii) Contains fewer than 10,000 milligrams of total dissolved solids per liter".
4.3

Period of Performance
The time period for both PA and compliance assessments is stated in 40 CFR Part 191 as 10,000 years. Comments were raised by stakeholders on drafts of both 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 , that the PA should model performance for 100,000 years or more. However, the EPA has maintained that times beyond 10,000 years are important, but that a disposal system capable of meeting the requirements for 10,000 years will continue to protect people and the environment well beyond 10,000 yearss. The WIPP is sited in a stable geological area and the CCA6 demonstrated that only negligible releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment might over 10,000 years. The four naturalprocesses that have a progressive effect on the structure of the region and the hydrogeological properties of the units in the vicinity of the WIPP are regional uplift and tectonics, erosion, salt deformation, and dissolution. The rates of these processes are such that the WIPP repository is expected to maintain its integrity under undisturbed performance conditions well beyond 100,000 years.
Treatment of Uncertainty
Three principal types of uncertainty, related to the three different stages in the PA development process shown in 
Scenario uncertain~.
A scenario is a broad-brush description of the fiture evolution of the disposal system. Scenario uncertainty arises through different assumptions about the FEPs that may occur in the future and, hence, which FEPs and FEP interactions are included in a particular scenario.
2.
Conceptual model uncertain~. Conceptual models are a set of qualitative assumptions used to describe a system or subsystem. At a minimum these assumptions concern the geometry and dimensionality of the syste~initial and boundary conditions, time dependence, and the nature of the relevant physical and chemical processes. Conceptual model uncertainty arises because there may be more than one way of describing a processor system within a particular context and in accordance with the data that are available. (a) Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.
(b) Assessments of mining effects maybe limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for naturalresources. Mining shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only once during the regulatory time fi-ame.
(c) Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but
shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that maybe used for fluid injection activities.
(d) Performance assessments need not consider processes and events that have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.
(e) Any compliance application(s) shall include information which: (1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may affect the disposal system, (2) Identities the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events included in performance assessments; and (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section were not included in performance assessmentresults provided in any compliance application.
Therefore, a comprehensive FEP list is required as a basis for the development of the WIPP PA (40 CFR $ 194.32 (e)(l)), but the only human activities that are required to be evaluated in developing scenarios are those currently occurring in the vicinity of the WIPP. The criteria for the scope of the compliance assessments (40 CFR1 94.54) are similar, but without the need to consider Mm-e drilling and mining other than that conducted on existing leases in the near future. The criteria and requirements for the treatment of future events and processes are also relevant to defining the scope of the PA, and are discussed in Sect. 4.5.1. 40 CFR S 194.32(d) allows the elimination of FEPs from the PA on the basis of low probability. Natural events for which there is no evidence of occurrence within the regional vicinity of the WIPP (the Delaware Basinf) were eliminated from the WIPP PA on this basis, as were waste-and repository-induced FEPs for which no mechanisms were identified that could result in their occurrence within the disposal system. 40 CFR tj 191.13(a) uses the term "significant" and, therefore, allows elimination of FEPs from PA calculations on the basis of insignificant consequence. Consequence can refer to effects on the site or to radiological consequence.
On this basis, the DOE omitted FEPs from the CCA WIPP PA where there was a reasonable expectation that cumulative releases, as represented by the calculated CCDFS, would not be significantly changed by such omissions.
In particular, the effects of some current practices as specified in 40 CFR $ 194.32(c) , such as brine extraction, fluid injection, and COZ disposal, were eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence31.
f To avoid inconsistent interpretation, 40 CFR Part 194 defines the Delaware Basin as "... those surface and subsurface features which lie inside the boundary formed to the north, east and west of the disposal system by the innermost edge of the Capitan Reef, and formed, to the south, by a straightline drawn fi-om the southeasternpoint of the Davis Mountains to the most southwesternpoint of the Glass Mountains."
.
In accordance with 40 CFR $$194.32(e) , the development of the WIPP FEP list, the elimination of FEPs, and the listing of FEPs that were retained for inclusion in the WIPP PA were documented in Appendix SCR of the CCA.
FEPs that were eliminated were done so on the basis of their low, probability of occurrence, their insignificant consequences, or as specified by the regulations (e.g., future states-the EPA specified that future human activities be represented as they are today such that futuristic activities would not need to be considered in scenario development). 29) . A tabulation of the alternative conceptual models considered in the WIPP PA, and how they were dealt with in the assessment, was submitted by the DOE to the EPA during review of the CCAS2. The evaluation of the adequacy of the DOE's conceptual models was largely conducted by peer review (see Sect. 4.4.7).
Conceptual Model Uncertainty
Further, as part of its rulernaking, the EPA required DOE to conduct a Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT) that evaluated uncertaintiesidentified by the EPA in both conceptual models and parameter valuess3'34.
ParameterUncertainty
There are extensive references to parameter uncertainty in 40 CFR Part 194 and associated documents. It is apparent from 40 CFR $ 194.34(b) that the EPA expects the PA to use probability density fimctions (PDFs) or distributions to account for parameter uncertainty by stating that probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values shall be developed and documented in any compliance application. This requires the DOE to use a probabilistic modeling technique, as set out at 40 CFR $ 194.34(c) , which states that computational techniques that draw random samples from across the entire range of the probability distributions shall be used in generating CCDFS and shall be documented in any compliance application. As a result of the above criteria, different types of parameter uncertainty are accounted for separately in the PA calculations for compliance with the Containment Requirements. A family of CCDFS allows a distinction to be made between stochastic uncertaint~, which controls the shape of a single CCDF, and subjective uncertainfl, which results in a distribution of CCDFS.
provide additional quantitative information about this type of event, and these uncertainties must be defined using (e) Any compliance application shall display the fill range of CCDFS generated.
(Q Any compliance application shall provide information which demonstrates that there is at least a 95 percent level of statistical cotildence that the mean of the population of CCDFS meets the containment requirements of$191. 13 of this chapter.
The criterion at 40 CFR~194.34(d) is intended to ensure that sufficient samples are generated to cover the full range of parameter values included in the PA, and hence that the calculated mean does represent a reliable estimate of disposal system performance. In the CCA, the DOE argued that a randomly selected CCDF has a 0.99 probability of lying below the 99th percentile of the population at cumulative releases of 1 and 10, and that for n randomly selected CCDFS, the probability of them all lying below the 99th percentile at cumulative releases of 1 and 10 is 0.99". Conversely, the probability of at least one CCDF exceeding the 99th percentile at cumulative releases of 1 and 10 is ( 1-0.99"). In order to satisfy the criteria at 40 CFR $ 194.34(d) , the number of CCDFS must be such that
(1-0.99") 20.95, and hencen2298. The EPA accepted this analysis and agreed that the 300 CCDFS generated by the DOE for the CCA were sufficient to satisfy the criterion.
In its Response to Comments on 40 CFR Part 19416,the EPA explained the basis at 40 CFR $ 194.34(f) for requiring the mean of the population of CCDFS to meet the Containment Requirements, rather than the median or a higher percentile. The EPA believes that a measure of central tendency provides the best estimate of the disposal system's performance for the purpose of regulatory decision making. The EPA argued that the requirement for random sampling across the full range of parameter distributions ensures that the distribution of CCDFS will encompass the consequences of low-probability events or values. The use of the median, rather than the mean, would not take account of the extent to which these low-probability events or values skew the distribution of CCDFS, and a higher percentile would give them undue weight.
A determination of compliance should be based on a value determined horn the entire distribution of possible CCDFS. However, the CCDFS presented in a PA are a subset of the infinite population of CCDFS that could be (d) The number of estimates generated pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section shall be large enough such that the maximum estimates of doses and concentrations generated exceed the 99th
percentile of the population of estimates with at least a 0.95 probability. The requirement for demonstrating that a sufficient number of samples has been used to calculate doses and concentrations is similar to that for CCDFS at $ 194.34(d). For compliance assessments, the criterion at~194.55(f)
differs from that at $ 194.34(f) for the PA by specifying the use of confidence limits for both the mean and the median. There is no discussion by the EPA of the reasons for specifying both measures.
As stated in Sect. 4.2, the DOE used a set of conservative bounding assumptions regarding exposure pathways to demonstrate that the maximum doses to individuals and concentrations in USDWS were orders of magnitude below the Individual and Groundwater Protection Requirements. The DOE successfidly argued (Section 8.1.4 of Ref . 6) that, if a conservatively calculated maximum complied with the disposal standards,the mean and median and their upper 95°/0confidence limit would also complysb.
Sensitivity Analyses
The EPA criteria do not explicitly require sensitivity analyses for the results of the WIPP PA, although a sensitivity analysis is required for the monitoring assurance criterion at~194.42 (see Sect. 4.7.2). Under the criteria to document the development of input parameters for the PA at $ 194.23(c)(4) and 194.34(b), the DOE did conduct a sensitivity analysis of parameters used in the CCA WIPP PA37 (see also Appendix SA of Ref. 6). Furthermore, as part of its ndemaking, the EPA conducted its own sensitivity analyses to evaluate the significance of uncertainty in PA parametervalues3*.
Peer Review
Peer review is an important method of reducing qualitative uncertainty (Fig. 2) . At 40 CFR~194.27(a), the EPA required the DOE to carry out peer reviews in three areas, the first of which related to the conceptual models used in the CCA WIPP PA, and the second of which had a bearing on the PA modeling of waste-related FEPs: published February 1988 (incorporation by reference as specified in $194.5); corroborating data; confmatory testing; or a quality assurance program that is equivalent in effect to ASME NQA-1-1989 edition, ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition, and ASME NQA-3-1989 edition [excluding Section 2. l(b) and (c) and Section 17.1]. (Incorporation by reference as specified in~194.5).
Treatment of Future Events, Processes, and Human Intrusion Issues
This section discusses how criteria in 40 CFR Part 194 prescribe the PA treatment of several contentious FEPs or issues, including the human activities of drilling and mining. The numerical implementation of these issues are described in Ref. 28 . For the CCA WIPP PA, in terms of the PA process in Fig. 2 , these criteria applied particularly during the development of conceptual and mathematical models and the parameterization of the PA database.
Treatmentof FutureEvents and Processes
The 40 (1) In considering the effects of hydrogeologic conditions on the disposal systeq the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to hydrogeologic conditions.
(2) In considering the effects of geologic conditions on the disposal systerq the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to geologic conditions, including, but not limited to: dissolution; near surface geomorphic features and processes; and related subsidence in the geologic units of the disposal system.
(3) In considering the effects of climatic conditions on the disposal syste~the Department shall document in any compliance application%to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to fiture climate cycles of increased precipitation (as compared to present conditions).
The assumption of current practice (40 (2FR~194.25(a) ) is based on the EPA's wish to limit speculation and uncertainty in the PA. For example, in the Supplementary Information to 40 CFR Part 1945, the EPA statesthat:
The Agency recognizes the inherently conjectural nature of specifications on fiture states and wishes to minimize such speculation in compliance applications. The Agency has found no acceptable methodology that could make reliable predictions of the future state of society, science, languages or other characteristics of future mankind. The Agency does believe that established scientific methods could make plausible predictions regarding the fhture state of three classes of naturalprocesses, namely geologic, hydrogeologic and climatic conditions.
To comply with 40 CFR $ 194.25(b)(l) and (2) regarding changes to hydrogeological and geological conditions, the CCA WIPP PA probabilistically sampled fi-om 100 transmissivity fields generated for the Culebra Dolomite overlying the repository (see variable CTRAN in Table 1 of Ref. 29) . Other potential changes in geological conditions were eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of either low probability or low consequence30.
The potential effects of climate change (40 CFR $ 194.25(c) ) were also captured through the modeling of the Culebra, by applying a probabilistically sampled recharge factor (the Climate Index) to scale up the transmissivity fields by a factor between 1 and 2.25 (see variable CULCLIM in Table 1 of Ref 29) . The maximum value for the Climate Index was derived through an analysis of past and potential future climate change45and three-dimensional hydrogeological modeling of its potential effects4c.
Treatmentof Mining
In the vicinity of the WIPP site, economically-viable mining of two potassium salts from the McNutt Potash Zone in the Salado Formation is an ongoing activity47. 40 CFR $ 194.32(b) and ( Some natural resources in the vicinity of WIPP can be extracted by mining. These natural resources lie within the geologic formations found at shallower depths than the tunnels and shafts of the repository and do not lie vertically above the repository. Were mining of these resources to occur, this could alter the hydrologic properties of overlying formations -including the most transmissive layer in the disposal systew the Culebra dolomite -so as to either increase or decrease groundwater travel times to the accessible environment. For the purposes of modeling these hydrologic properties, this change can be well represented by making corresponding changes in the values for the hydraulic conductivity. The Agency has conducted a review of the data and scientific literature discussing the effects mining can induce in the hydrologic properties of a formation. Based on its review of available information, the Agency expects that mining can, in some instances, increase the hydraulic conductivity of overlying formations by as much as a factor of 1,000, although smaller and even negligible changes can also be expected to occur. Thus, the final rule requires DOE to consider the effects of mining in performance assessments. In order to consider the effects of mining in performance assessments, the DOE may use the location-specific values of hydraulic conductivity, established for the different spatial locations within the Culebra dolomite, and treat them as sampled parameters varying between unchanged and increased 1,000-fold relative to the value thatwould exist in the absence of mining.
From this text, it is apparent that the EPA concluded that there are no minerals vertically above the repositos imilar in quality and type to those currently being extracted elsewhere in the Delaware Basin. Furthermore, the effects of mining in terms of changes in hydraulic conductivity can be modeled as occurring only in the Culebra.
Consistent with 40 CFR~194.32(c), in the CCA WIPP PA, all economically mineable resources in the vicinity of the disposal system outside the controlled area were assumed to be extracted in the near t%tnre.The extent of mining assumed was based on an analysis of the map of existing leases, setbacks from existing boreholes, and the presence of ore in the lease48.Consideration of fiture mining within the controlled area was limited to mining at the locations of resources that are similar in quality and type to those currently extracted fi-om the Delaware Basin. An angle of draw was used to translate the area mined in the Salado to the area affected in the overlying Culebra. In its Background Information Document for 40 CFR Part 194*5, the EPA discussed the possible range in value of the angle of draw. The DOE used an angle of draw of 45°to be consistent with the EPA's discussions and calculations.
For the area in the Culebra affected by mining, the effects were incorporated in the PA by multiplying the locationspecific Culebra transmissivity values by a randomly sampled factor (mining multiplier) between 1 and 1,000 (see variable CTRANSFM in Table 1 of Ref. 29) . In accordance with 40 CFR $ 194.32(b) , to determine whether mining in the controlled area occurred in the future, the CCA WIPP PA used a Poisson model with a 104 probability of mining occurring in any yea~g. In accordance with 40 CFR $ 194.32(b) , the occurrence of mining was limited to only once per 10,000 years, so multiple mining events were not modeled. (1) Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources (other than those resources provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste)
Treatmentof Drilling
is the most severe human intrusion scenario.
(2) In performance assessments,drilling events shall be assumed to occur in the Delaware Basin at random intervals in time and space during the regulatory time frame.
(3) The frequency of deep drilling shall be calculated in the following manner: (i) Identify deep drilling that has occurred for each resource in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years prior to the time at which a compliance application is prepared.
(ii) The total rate of deep drilling shall be the sum of the rates of deep drilling for each resource.
(4) The frequency of shallow drilling shall be calculated in the following manner: (i) Identify shallow drilling that has occurred for each resource in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years prior to the time at which a compliance application is prepared.
(ii) The total rate of shallow drilling shall be the sum of the rates of shallow drilling for each resource. (iii) In considering the historical rate of all shallow drilling, the Department may, if justified, consider only the historical rate of shallow drilling for resources of similar type and quality to those in the controlled area.
(c) Performance assessmentsshall document that in analyzing the consequences of drilling events, the Department assumed that: (1) Future drilling practices and technology will remain consistent with practices in the Delaware Basin at the time a compliance application is prepared. Such t%ture drilling practices shall include, but shall not be limited to: the types and amounts of drilling fluids; borehole depths, diameters, and seals; and the ii-action of such boreholes that are sealed by humans; and (2) Natural processes will degrade or otherwise affect the capability of boreholes to transmitfluids over the regulatory time fi-ame. to recover resources) to be eliminated from consideration in the PA. 40 CFR $ 194.33(b) dictates the probability model to be used for drilling events. In accordance with 40 CFR~194.33(b)(2), the CCA WIPP PA used a Poisson model to represent future drilling events as random in time based on the historical drilling rate:
where p is the probability that some number n, an integer, of drilling events will occur in a time interval At given a drilling frequency A (see Ref. 28 for additional discussion). Oil and gas are the only known resources below the WIPP horizon (655 meters) that have been exploited in the Delaware Basin. However, some potash and sulfur exploration boreholes have been drilled in the Delaware Basin to depths in excess of 655 meters below the surface relative to where the drilling occurred. Thus, consistent with 40 CFR $ 194.33(b) (3), the fbture rate of deep drilling within the controlled area and throughout the Delaware Basin was based on the rates of historical drilling for oil, gas, potash and sultir exploration, and oil and gas exploitation in the Delaware Basin (Appendix DEL of Ref. 6).
WIPP site investigation boreholes were excluded from the analysis.
Shallow drilling associated with exploration and extraction of water, potash, sulfur, oil, and gas has taken place in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years. However, of these resources, only water and potash are present at shallow depths (less than 655 meters below the surface) within the controlled area. Consistent with 40 CFR $ 194.33(c) , the modeling of future drilling practices in the CCA WIPP PA was based on current practices associated with the activities described above. Drilling was modeled in the CCA as standardrotary drilling with drilling muds. The drilling model parameters, such as drill bit diameter, were derived from surveys of current practice in the Delaware Basin. Other drilling techniques, such as air drilling, were eliminated from PA calculations because they are not current practice in the Delaware Basin49. Several stakeholders stated that air drilling was current practice. However, in its mlemaking7, the EPA illustrates how the DOE had appropriately applied the criterion at40 CFR $194.33:
Some commenters said that air drilling is already occurring in the Delaware Basin, and thus, should be considered in the PA. . .. The Agency found that air drilling is not used more frequently in the Delaware Basin as a whole than in the New Mexico portion of the Basin. At the 95°/0 statistical confidence level, EPA found that, at most, only 1.65°/0 of all wells in the Delaware Basin may have been drilled with air. In those records examined, none of the wells were drilled through the salt-bearing geologic formation, as would be required to penetrate the WIPP. . . . This additional information contlrms the Agency's conclusion . . . that air drilling is not a current practice in the Delaware Basin. In particular, air drilling through the salt section (where the waste is present) is not consistent with current drilling practices in the Delaware Basin. . . The EPA disagrees that the frequency of air drilling must be less than one in ten thousand wells in order for DOE to leave it out of the PA. Section 194.33(c)(1) requires DOE to look at "drilling practices at the time a compliance application is prepared." This requirement refers to typical industry practices in the Delaware Basin at the time a compliance application is prepared. . . . It was not intended to apply to experimental procedures, emergency procedures, or conjectured future practices. The Agency finds it unrealistic to consider a specific deep drilling method to be current practice or typical of drilling in the Delaware Basin when it is used for only a small percentage of all wells in the Basin.
On the basis of 40 CFR~194.33(d), the WIPP PA did not account for the effects of techniques used for resource extraction and recovery, such as pumping, secondary recovery or brine disposal that might be used subsequent to the drilling of a borehole in the future.
Borehole Plugging
Consistent with 40 CFR $ 194.33(c) , borehole plugging practices were accounted for in the WIPP PA based on a survey of current drilling practices in the Delaware BasinjO. Six plug configurations were identified that were potentially relevant to future borehole abandonment practice at the WIPP. These six configurations were approximated in the CCA WIPP PA by three conceptual plugging patterns: a continuous concrete plug; a two-plug model; and a three-plug modelzs. The degradation of the borehole plugs by naturalprocesses was also analyzed. In the two-plug and three-plug models, the steel casing that isolates water-bearing and brine-bearing units above the Salado was assumed to begin to degrade within decades after abandonment and to fail completely after 200 years.
The concrete plug above the Salado was also assumed to fail after 200 years, as a result of chemical degradation by brine following failure of the casing. After the plug and casing have failed, the PA assumed that the borehole was filled by a silty-sand-like material containing degraded concrete, corrosion products, and material that sloughs into the hole from the waKs. For the continuous plug model and for the concrete plugs below the WIPP horizon in the two-plug and three-plug models, where the chemical environment is less aggressive than above the Salado, the plug properties were kept constant for 10,000 years50.
InstitutionalControls
The criteria implementing the assurance requirements related to active and passive institutional controls (AICS and PICS; 40 CFR $ 194.41 and $ 194.43, respectively) $ 194.41(a) and $ 194.43(a) ) and an evaluation of their longevity and effectiveness ($ 194.41(a) and $ 194.43(b) ).
The EPA's expectation with regard to PICS is set out in the Supplementary Information to 40 CFR Part 1945: In adopting the assurance requirements in 40 CFR 191, EPA expressly limited the credit for active institutional controls. EPA prohibited performance assessments from considering any contributions from active institutionalcontrols for more than 100 years after disposal. See 40 CFR 191.14(a) . EPA declined to similarly limit the effect of PICS in reducing the likelihood of human intrusion. 50 Fed. Reg. 38080. By contrast, EPA contemplated that PICS may discourage the likelihood of human intrusion for some period of time longer than active institutional controls.
However, EPA indicated that it generally believed it was inappropriate to rely on PICS for extended periods of time. See 50 Fed. Reg. 38080 . Based on the public comments and consistent with EPA's general view that it is inappropriate to rely on PICS for very long periods of time, EPA is constraining in the final rule the length of time that EPA could consider granting credit for PICS to several hundred years. EPA's decision about the actual ei%cacy of PICs proposed for the WIPP will be based on DOE's compliance application but may not exceed this limit.
Further,the degree to which PICS might reduce the fimu-e drilling rate can be reliably determined only through informed judgment. The Agency agrees with the NACEPTg Committee that no rigorous and non-speculative method is available to determine the appropriate amount of credit for PICS. Thus, DOE's proposed reduction in the likelihood of human intrusion due to PICS would probably be conducted through an expert judgment process that considers the specific PICS to be gNational Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology implemented at the WIPP by DOE. The expert judgment performed specifically to determine the effect of PICS must satisfy the requirements of section 26 of today's action, on expert judgment.
The CCA WIPP PA took credit for 100°i6 effectiveness of AICS for 100 years, i.e., no human intrusions were modeled for the fust 100 years after closure. On the basis of an evaluation of the longevity and effectiveness of PICS51,the CCA WIPP PA assumed a 99~0 effectiveness of PICS for the period between 100 and 700 years. This had the effect of reducing the likelihood of fhtnre human intrusion in the period 100-700 years after closure to one hundredth of its vaIue after 700 years. However, the credit taken for PICS in the CCA was rejected by the EPA in its rulemaking', because "... DOE did not use an expert judgment elicitation to derive the credit, as explicitly envisioned by the Agency." This rejection did not affect the compliance of the WIPP with the disposal standards,as furtherPA calculations conducted without taking credit for PICS showed little effect on the calculated releases7'33'34.
Waste Loading
The distribution of different waste types in the repository is potentially significant when calculating releases due to intrusion of the repository by a drill string. At 40 CFR $194.24(d) , the criterion prescribes that, in the absence of a waste-loading scheme, the PA assumes random emplacement of waste in the repository:
194.24 Waste characterization.
(d) The Department shall include a waste loading scheme in any compliance application, or else performance assessments conducted pursuant to~194.32 and compliance assessments conducted pursuantto $194.54 shall assume random placement of waste in the disposal system.
For undisturbed performance calculations in the CCA WIYP PA, the waste inventory was assumed to be homogeneously distributed throughout the repository. For disturbed performance calculations, random sampling based on the repository design was used to determine if the drill bit intersected contact-handled (CH-TRU) or remote-handled (RH-TRU) waste28. For intersection of CH-TRU waste, the drill bit was assumed to penetrate three containers coming from three randomly-selected waste streams. Specifically, the waste streams penetrated were randomly sampled according to the proportion of the total waste inventory from each waste stream. For intersection of RH-TRU waste, the materialremoved by the drill bit was assumed to have the activity of a volume-averaged RH-TRU waste stream.
Documentation
In addition to the documentation required as part of the PA development process, as indicated in the criteria discussed in Sects. 4.2 to 4.5, criteria at\ 194.22 and $194.23 of 40 CFR Part 194 explicitly require documentation and QA of the models and data used in the PA. These criteria are summarized in Table 1 
Waste Characterization
The criteria at 40 CFR~194.24(b) require an analysis of the influence of various waste characteristics and corresponding components on disposal system performance. 40 CFR $ 194.24(c) goes on to require the setting of limits for significant waste components, and a demonstration that the WIPP complies with the disposal standardson the basis of these limits. A list of waste characteristics and components to be included in the analysis is given in the EPA criteria, and this list may have been influenced by preliminary WIPP PAs that showed such characteristics and components to be of potential significance to the predicted performance of the disposal system21'22'23. The prelimina~PAs were not solely developed to measure WIPP'S performance, but also to provide a development and refinement process for the PA as an adequate predictive tool for the WIPP. The CCA WIPP PA accounted for all of the waste characteristics specified in the regulations. The CCA specified waste acceptance criteria to meet upper or lower limits for metals, cellulosics, free water content in waste forms, and total curie content (for remote handled waste) in the repository. These limits are necessary to ensure that certain model assumptions and parameter values used in the CCA WIPP PA are valid and, therefore, thatthe results of the PA remain applicable.
Monitoring
A sensitivity analysis to determine significant disposal system parameters as candidates for monitoring is required as part of the implementation of the assurance requirements at 40 CFR $194.42 . The DOE developed monitoring plans according to whether: (1) they addressed significant disposal system parameters; (2) they addressed important disposal system concerns; (3) meaningful data could obtained in a short time period; (4) they could be conducted while preserving disposal system integrity and (5) 
Engineered Barriers
In the assurance requirements related to engineered barriers (40 CFR $ 194.14(d) analysis, documentation, and QA (e.g., $ 194.22, $ 194.23, ~194.32(e), $ 194.54(a) ). These criteria essentially ensure or codify good practice and promote traceability, thereby assisting the EPA and the public to evaluate the CCA. The criteria are not necessarily specific to the WIPP PA, and the DOE had already established a fm foundation in these areas prior to promulgation of 40 CFR Part 194. q Criteria to document and treat uncertainty (e.g., $ 194.27, $ 194.34, $ 194.55) . These criteria are a particular subset of the first criteria type described above, and are again not necessarily specific to the WIPP PA. However, they are highlighted here as a separatetype because they specifically apply to helping provide a reasonable expectation of compliance. The DOE approached the demand of reasonable expectation by developing and using a comprehensive and realistic probabilistic PA model. Conservative assumptions were also adopted where necessary; however, the intent was to avoid conservatism and include realism wherever possible. Finally, the WIPP PA has a continuing role in meeting the requirements that will be demanded in future regulation of the WIPP, as part both of the modification and the recertification processes. The modification process covers requests by the DOE for significant changes to the CCA basis, while the recertification process covers the requirement at Section 8(Q( 1) of the LWA]>2necessitating a recertification application to be submitted to the EPA at least once every five years during the operational lifetime of the WIPP. The DOE may request changes (operational efficiencies and enhancements) to the disposal system described in the CCA over the operational period of the WIPP. These planned changes may result from a number of initiatives, such as waste characterization process improvements. Furthermore, unplanned changes may arise, for example as a result of analysis of the WIPP monitoring programs. Changes will only receive regulatory approval after an impact assessment shows that the change will not lead to an unacceptable consequence. The DOE and its scientific advisor, Sandia National
Laboratories, are committed to the continuing development of the technical basis underlying the WIPP PA, so as to ensure that the WIPP PA remains a defensible and credible tool for under-pinning such impact assessments. $194.27,~194.32,$194.33, $194.34, 194.41, $194.43, $194.54, and $194.55 40 CFR $ 194.23(a) possible fhture states of the disposal system Mathematical models incorporate equations and boundary conditions which reasonably represent the mathematical formulation of the conceptual models; Numerical models provide numerical schemes which enable the mathematical models to obtain stable solutions; Computer models accurately implement the numerical models; Conceptual models have undergone peer review." Computer codes used to support any compliance application, to 40 CFR $ 194.23(b) comply with the requirements of ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-I 989 edition. All models and computer codes included as part of any compliance 40 CFR~194.23(c) application performance assessment calculation. "Documentation shall include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Descriptions of the theoretical backgrounds of each model and the method of analysis or assessment; (2) General descriptions of the models; discussions of the limits of applicability of each modefi detailed instructions for executing the computer codes, including hardware and software requirements, input and output formats with explanations of each input and output variable and parameter (e.g., parameter name and units); listings of input and output files from a sample computer run; and reports on code verification, benchmarking, validation, and quality assurance procedures; (3) Detailed descriptions of the structure of computer codes and complete listings of the source codes; (4) Detailed descriptions of data collection procedures, sources of data, data reduction and analysis, and code input parameter development; (5) Any necessary licenses; and (6) An explanation of the manner in which models and computer codes incorporate the effects of parametercorrelation."
